## 3 December 1971

A.D.MORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUDJECT:

First Meeting of the National Security

Council Intelligence Committee

Non bers Present:

Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Irwin,

Mr. Packard, Admiral Moorer, Mr. Helms

Others Present:

Dr. Cline and Mr. Weiss, State; Mr. Marshall.

Dr. Hall and Mr. Buzhardt, Defense; Vice Adm.

Weinel, JCS:

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- 1. Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by saying that this was intended to be an organizational session, with the principal purpose of deciding how the committee will operate and what it will do. He said that this was a group of senior intelligence consumers which as he saw it should neet at fairly lengthly intervals. Its primary function would be to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the product and to determine what else might be needed.
- 2. He felt that the staff work for the NSCIC should be carried out by a subordinate committee which should be chaired by a representative of the DCI. He said that the committee would have nothing to do with budgetary asepcts of the intelligence process, since these matters would be considered by other committees. He felt that some of the production of Mr. Marshall's net assessment committee would be brought to the NSCIC.
- 3. Dr. Kissinger then asked that each member prepare a statement of what his department's requirements for intelligence are. The group should then meet again in perhaps ten days to two weeks to look at these lists and to work out a charter and a "work program" or plan of action for the on-going deliberations of the committee. He thought that after that the committee would not have to meet for perhaps two months.

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- 4. Mr. Helms agreed that it was not necessary to meet very frequently but he stressed the importance of this committee, since this is the first time that the intelligence con munity has ever had any formal means of receiving the views of its principal consumers on the product. He thought that it was important not only to assess what is needed and how good it is but also what is not needed. Dr. Kissinger and others agreed with this point but Mr. Packard cautioned that it would not necessarily be easy to agree on what is dispensable.
- 5. The DCI brought up the question of tactical intelligence, saying that Schator Ellender and others had been after him to remove tactical intelligence from consideration in the national intelligence budget. They felt that this should be put back into the Services so as to reduce the total national intelligence bill. Mr. Packard agreed with this and said that this subject should certainly be on the agenda for the next session. Admiral Moorer cautioned that tactical intelligence cannot be centrally controlled in Washington and he and Mr. Packard agreed that a good deal of what might be considered tactical intelligence should in fact be looked at as operational activity, e.g., SOSUS. In this connection Dr. Kissinger said he saw no reason why tactical intelligence could not be broken out of the national budget. He added that he would appreciate having a recommendation for a system of examining such tactical intelligence as the monthly reconnaissance schedules. Admiral Moorer said he had commissioned a study of the various peripheral reconnaissance activities and agreed that after the study is completed, it would be brought to the NSCIC for policy guidance.

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